Grant Woods, Sydney Airport’s general manager airport operations, ponders the future of airport security in the Asia-Pacific region.

As aviation in the region grows there is significant advantage in major airlines, airports and governments collaborating to ensure that aviation security remains effective whilst enabling the movement of passengers and cargo.

Air traffic growth is a defining characteristic of the early 21st century and nowhere is this more significant than in the Asia-Pacific region.

The fast developing economies of China and other Asian states and the process of globalisation mean that business and leisure travel in the region is growing strongly.

One third of the 28,000 jet aircraft built over the next 20 years are destined for the Asia-Pacific region. Regional airlines are pioneering new routes and business models with varying degrees of success.

Growth in the region has involved both full service carriers and a multitude of new start-up airlines across market segments. Low-cost carriers in particular have been beneficiaries of the economic upturn. Some major airports in the region have had to invest quickly in greater capacity and supporting infrastructure.

As markets develop, more airports will be required to serve major cities across the region and the emerging role of the major regional hubs is particularly significant. As both intra and inter regional traffic rises, hub airports are becoming increasingly important ‘switching points’ between the region and the other major aviation markets in North America and Europe. If not already, these hubs are also developing into major destinations and business centres in their own rights.

Hub airports now serve destinations vastly different from those of the traditional ‘safe’ routes. Flights today link them with locations where the security threat both at home and abroad is real. As a consequence, airports must consider these risks and new security challenges, particularly from inbound aircraft.

Control and management of airport security must become ‘outcomes-focused’ and move forward towards more self-regulation, with airports taking greater responsibility for their own security coordination, allowing quicker responses to specific security threats targeted at the airport.

Border and security agencies are required to respond to the emerging risks. From an aviation perspective, Asia-Pacific holds many unique challenges. Active terrorist organisations and radicalised individuals are evident in several countries in the region. At the same time, travel patterns within the region link countries with significantly different threat profiles and perceptions of the terrorist threat. Aviation security standards vary across the region and it is likely that this variability will persist and may grow.

A key challenge will be to achieve a consistent focus on aviation security across the region. Some estimates suggest that a major aviation event in the region would likely result in tens of billion dollars in economic damage. There is growing recognition in the region that aviation security is an important contributing factor to sustaining regional growth in the short and long term.

Large airports are leading the way by integrating security more fully into business models and passenger processes. But large airports and airlines can only do so much in isolation to improve standards. Arguably new strategies are needed to manage the Asia-Pacific aviation security environment over the next twenty years.

The threat however is not simply about terrorism. As global travel grows, serious and organised crime groups are seeking to use the aviation system to move money, goods and people clandestinely.

An important objective for both government and industry is to ensure that new approaches to passenger travel and security are implemented in a timely, co-ordinated and measured way across the region – aviation security is only as good as the weakest link in the network.

There have been lost opportunities. All EU member countries jointly introduced enhanced security measures to limit the amount of Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAGs) passing through the passenger screening points. The US also enabled similar rules that required passenger searches to US standards. But, the LAGs response continues to be piecemeal across the Asia-Pacific region.

Evolving technology has the potential to reduce security costs, while at the same time increasing security outcomes. Although technologies may be more invasive they are likely to be accepted as providing improved security outcomes if introduced and managed effectively.

At present the region has no standards for access control and emerging technologies to consider for future implementation to assist in managing risk. However, airport security is always interested in emerging technologies that in the longer term may ensure higher levels of passenger throughput or greater security. Regional airports will need to consider the ever increasing sophisticated solutions and their applications.

There should be stronger regional ties with the overseas last port of call and destination countries and greater emphasis on harmonisation of security systems and services.

The region’s governments have a key challenge to improve regional aviation security co-ordination in an effort to mitigate risks in the system and to support the hub airports. Governments must ensure close harmonisation and learning outcomes for better practise legislation.

The role of the hub airports in this circumstance is particularly important. Hubs are key interchange points between the security systems of countries and airports in the region. Vulnerabilities in aviation security in one country may be transmitted through hubs to other countries. Hubs are also vulnerable to the disruptions associated with local and international aviation security events and changes.

The aviation industry is highly networked and the performance of hub airports affects overall system performance. Major airlines have a significant stake in the security performance at hub airports. Conversely security performance at the hubs is heavily influenced by the performance of major airlines, including their security activities.

A tripartite collaboration between government, major airports and airlines provides one possible avenue to advance aviation security outcomes in the region. By working together major government and corporate players in the region can assist one another in maintaining a secure foundation for sustained development.

As the major airports continue to grow, the present arrangements for national intelligence gathering and information sharing may not respond adequately to airport security requirements of the future.

The established hierarchy for responding to threats and the identification of risk has the potential for delay and a model of airport security co-ordination that devolves the management of security risk down to the airport operator is a sound governance regime.

For governments such collaboration is complementary to existing capacity development activities and provides a further practical avenue to improve and advance security performance. For major airports and airlines the ability to work closely with and influence governments in their approach to aviation security can assist in managing risk, passenger facilitation and investment flows. What would the collaboration seek to achieve:
• Support for high quality aviation security that balances security, passenger facilitation and business outcomes
• Share and promote good practice
• Contribute to the implementation of new security technologies and processes
• Enhance information flows to industry and passengers
• Provide coordinated support within the region for further building capability across all economies

It’s not necessary to develop a system that has global influence like the EU or TSA in America but why can’t we start with key regional airports implementing consistent measures to ease the security burden and avoid confusion?

Food for thought?

About the author Grant Woods is Sydney Airport’s general manager airport operations and chairman of ACI Asia-Pacific’s Aviation Security Committee.

Asia-Pacific Airports 2008 Issue 3

Are we about to enter a new era for the security screening of passengers at airports? Joe Bates investigates.

Investment in airport security is expected to soar this year as gateways across the world ramp up their explosive detection efforts in the wake of the alleged Christmas Day bomb plot.

Billions of dollars were spent on upgrading airport security in 2009 and the figure is expected to jump significantly this year with the introduction of full-body scanners following the alleged attempt by Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, to detonate a bomb onboard Northwest Airlines flight 253 to Detroit.

Vancouver International Airport was one of the first Asia-Pacific gateways to install full-body scanners when it introduced a machine earlier this year.

Elsewhere, India’s government has pledged to install full-body scanners at Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport by May and then roll them out across the country’s international gateways if they prove a success.

Other Asia-Pacific countries announcing plans to introduce full-body scanners in the coming months include the Philippines and South Korea.

Bangkok Suvarnabhumi has already removed its single full-body scanner after an ‘unsuccessful’ trial but Airports of Thailand (AoT) president, Serirat Prasutanond, insists that the operator will shortly launch trials of new equipment.

Australia’s airports are also set to get full body scanners as part of the government’s A$200 million plan to upgrade security at the nation’s gateways.

The controversial scanners will start appearing in airports next year alongside an increased number of police and sniffer dogs amid a wider security presence.

“No nation can afford to be complacent when it comes to security,” declares Australia’s Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd.

“The government’s highest priority is the safety and security of Australians.

” A Sydney Airport spokesman adds: “In relation to scanners, Sydney Airport will meet the implementation schedules determined by the Australian government.

The process of implementation is currently being worked through with passenger flow rates, costs and the management of departure performance being studied at present.

“As with any significant change to security requirements, we will implement this carefully to ensure we have consistency of application (the process of screening) and we fully understand how the best security outcome can be achieved.

We also need to provide appropriate standards of facilitation to passengers and make sure we sensibly address issues such as privacy matters and how passengers who are concerned about being screened by this technology are handled.”

The surge in orders has led one manufacturer, L-3 Security & Detection Systems, to reveal that it has upped production to 50 machines a month in order to keep up with demand.

The big question, of course, is would full-body scanners have detected the explosives allegedly hidden in the underpants of Abdulmutallab? Manufacturers L3 Security & Detection Systems, Smiths Detection and Rapiscan Systems insist that body scanners provide aviation with the best technological solution to the threat of concealed weapons and explosives on passengers.

However, the many variables involved in airport security ranging from operator training and performance to the physical layout of the checkpoint mean that none could categorically state that the machines are infallible.

Rapiscan’s vice president global marketing, Andrew Goldsmith, explains: “It is difficult to answer that question because detection depends on a number of non-technical factors.

What I can say with 100% certainty is that when used by trained operators, our full-body scanners significantly increase the likelihood of detecting small, well concealed non-metallic threats compared to metal detectors, physical pat-down searches or other people screening technologies.”

This assessment is supported by Smiths Detection’s director strategy and communication, Bernhard Semling, who notes: “Body scanners are capable of detecting the explosive substances allegedly used on flight 253, but while it is possible to detect such objects, providing an absolute guarantee that they would have done is not possible because of the other variables involved in the screening process.”

L3 Security & Detection System’s senior vice president, Bill Frain, simply says: “Our systems are specifically designed to find this type of threat – including a wide range of plastic, liquid and other metallic and non-metallic threats hidden on the body.”

So what kind of technology are we talking about and how safe is it? There are currently two main passenger scanning technologies available that can scan the human body for potential threats – backscatter and millimetre wave (MMW).

MMW beams millimetre wave energy over a person to create a 3D image of the human body while backscatter technology bounces very low energy x-rays off of a person to generate an image.

Both processes are estimated to take an average of 10 seconds including the time it takes security staff to assess the image.

“The timing varies depending on the system and the technology employed,” says Semling.

“Image capture can be instantaneous for real-time systems or at most take a few seconds.

Including time for assessment of the image, the process is comparable in time to the existing screening procedures based on metal detection and hand search, but has the potential to be more time-efficient and for sure is more passenger-friendly.”

One of the advantages of backscatter technology is that it has been well studied, understood and regulated for decades and, as a result, received a clean bill of health from a number of medical bodies.

They include the American College of Radiology, which recently noted “an airline passenger flying cross-country is exposed to more radiation from the flight than from screening by one of these devices.”

While the US’s National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement (NCRP) reports that a passenger would need to experience 100 backscatter scans per year to reach what they classify as a “negligible individual dose”.

MMW security scans pose no health risks whatsoever as unlike certain types of medical scanner, they do not use X-rays.

L3 Security & Detection System’s Frain, enthuses: “Millimetre waves are non-ionizing and do not penetrate the skin like X-rays.

The energy levels generated by our machines are a fraction of what is generated by commonly used household devices.”

Without a doubt, the most controversial aspect of full-body scanners is their intrusive nature, and public fears about their introduction have not been helped by newspaper headlines warning that passengers face virtual strip searches at airports.

Indeed, feelings about the issue are running so high that one US lawmaker recently declared “we don’t need to look at naked eight year-olds and grandmothers to secure airplanes.”

Amsterdam Schiphol, for one, is adamant that its MMW ‘Security Scan’ devices pose no privacy threat as the image shown is a stylised human figure and not their actual body.

Passengers simply walk into the device and raise their hands above their head for three seconds, and walk out again.

The machine automatically highlights any ‘foreign objects’ on the stylised human image and, if it cannot be identified, the passenger will be subjected to a hand search.

The Transport Security Administration (TSA) in the US claims that blurring faces and other body parts together with deleting images immediately after they have been viewed safeguards passenger modesty.

Undergoing a full-body scan in the US is also 100% optional, although those refusing to be screened will be subjected to a ‘full-body pat down’.

In the US, the screener that observes the images is located in a ‘remote location’ away from the checkpoint so avoiding any potential embarrassment for the passenger.

Not surprisingly, the equipment manufacturers believe that there is little foundation to the privacy concerns surrounding full-body scanners.

L3’s Frain says: “Our machines offer multiple levels of privacy protection that can be customised to reinforce privacy processes and procedures.

They include remote monitoring, silhouetted and blurred images and deletion after use.

In terms of the silhouettes, the 3D black and white image the remote analyst sees makes it virtually impossible to identify anyone.”

Semling assures: “Smiths Detection’s full-body scanning equipment is designed to fully address basic rights issues such as privacy, data security and health protection.”

Says Rapiscan’s Goldsmith: “Do I believe that they contravene a person’s basic human rights? Absolutely not! We believe that when used as part of a well-designed and well-regulated aviation security programme, full-body scanners can help protect the rights of passengers to travel safely.

In fact, many passengers find them less intrusive than physical pat downs.”

What is clear, however, is that full-body scanners should be just one of the security technologies and procedures adopted by an airport to ensure safety on the ground and in the sky.

Smiths Detection’s Semling certainly has no qualms about admitting that full-body scanners are far from the only answer when it comes to detecting explosives/weapons hidden internally or under a passengers’ clothing.

“There is no single solution to a threat situation as complex as that presented at an aviation checkpoint.

Body scanners are a major improvement over the current process that relies on metal detection and random physical search on a subset of passengers,” he says.

“Other highly reliable technologies such as trace detection provide complimentary and orthogonal capability.

Combinations of these technologies in a layered approach provide a more comprehensive detection capability and help close as many security gaps as possible.”

Although not opposed to the installation of full-body scanners at airports, the Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA) has voiced concern at the global reaction to the alleged Christmas Day bomb plot.

“Flying is widely recognised as the safest form of travel, reinforced by a robust regime of established security procedures.

Unfortunately, it is human nature that each new security incident prompts a desire to introduce yet more security measures,” AAPA says in a statement.

“There is always political pressure to react, but this often smacks of the need to be seen to be doing something rather than thinking through the appropriate action to take.

“The public understand that no society can credibly claim to provide perfect security.

It takes real political maturity to remain calm, and not fall into the trap of knee jerk reactions, such as the imposition of new security measures of unproven effectiveness.

Additional security measures are only justified when it can be demonstrated that the benefits outweigh the additional burdens they impose on society.

“Treating each of the six million passengers who fly every day as potential terrorists and subjecting them to virtual strip searches and patdowns already borders on the absurd, particularly when compared to our approach to public security in other aspects of our daily lives.

Doing so comes at a cost, already measured in tens of billions of dollars annually.

“Whilst new screening technologies are constantly under evaluation, including full-body scanners and automatic explosive detection systems, there is insufficient evidence regarding their effectiveness to justify their immediate deployment, not to mention unresolved health and privacy issues.”

The huge anticipated spend on full-body scanners this year will ensure that over $40 billion has been invested on improving aviation’s security infrastructure since 9/11, according to reports carried out by Washington-based industry tracker, Homeland Security Research Corporation.

In the US alone, recent events have resulted in an additional $1 billion being earmarked for aviation security, with a sizeable chunk of the total being set aside for the nationwide roll out of full-body scanners at airports. Elsewhere, Europe’s airports are believed to be facing a possible €1 billion bill for the new body scanners on top of the €1 billion investment they will be required to ensure that they comply with the new Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAGS) regulations.

Indeed, ACI Europe calculates that security expenses at the continent’s gateways have risen from an average of between 5% and 8% of an airport’s operating costs pre-9/11 to about 35% today.

It also notes that 41% of airport staff now work in security related jobs.

While Frost & Sullivan expect spending on airport security in the Asia-Pacific region to exceed $6.1 billion this year in response to the terrorist threat and rising traffic demand.

Recent events have proved that terrorism still remains a very real threat to aviation nearly a decade on from 9/11, and with that threat constantly evolving, clearly the big spend on new security equipment is set to go on for the foreseeable future.

Asia-Pacific Airports 2010 Issue 1

A multi-layered approach is the best way to secure the airport perimeter, writes Alec Owen.

While airports have unique characteristics and requirements for perimeter security, they still follow the fundamental protection rules known as the Five Ds – define, deter, detect, delay and detain.

An effective perimeter security system consistently prevents intruders from reaching their target.

Like any perimeter security application, the key to effective airport perimeter security is to develop a multi-layered intrusion detection package.

And by taking a holistic approach to site security, the individual elements or layers complement each other, working together to provide a strong security regime to protect against both known and perceived threats.

There is no single ‘quick-fix’ technology in the market to take care of this. Each element plays a critical role in securing a perimeter.

The first step is risk profiling the site to be protected. For example, is this an international or a domestic airport? Are there buildings (potential hiding spots) on or near the perimeter? Is the area open and flat or undulating? Is it subject to weather extremes like strong winds or snow?

Next, profile the types of intruder you may encounter – vandals, petty thieves, trespassers, or professional ‘special forces’ type intruders?

Next, assess the ‘attractiveness’ or potential targets contained within the site – are there goods of high value or worth on site, or are aircraft the target?

Once you have profiled and documented the site, the first layer to examine is the perimeter fence. Is the fence suitable for the application and potential or expected risks and will it provide a suitable deterrent for intruders?

If vandals and trespassers are the major threat, then a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire is probably adequate, whereas if you are expecting a professional intruder trained to a higher level, then you may want to consider a razor wire topped anti-climb fence.

There is no point spending more money than you need to on a fence, but conversely, the fence must match the profiled security risk.

It should not only define the boundary of the site, but also provide enough of a deterrent and delay to give security staff time to swing a CCTV camera around and visually verify the intrusion attempt or activity and respond accordingly.

An important point here is the delay element. The perimeter fence should be situated a reasonable distance away from the buildings, hangars, or items to be protected so time is needed by an intruder to cross this ground.

If fences are close to these buildings, they need to be more difficult to scale or penetrate in order to provide enough delay for security staff to respond.

A perimeter intrusion detection system (PIDS) attached tothe fence is the first line of warning of an intrusion on the perimeter and identifies the location of an attempted entry. There are a multitude of systems and technologies on the market for detecting intruders climbing fences and airports have unique requirements to consider.

As airport perimeters are typically in the 12 to 16 kilometre range with some as large as 25km, a traditional zoned-based system may not be as cost effective as it would be for smaller sites.

It’s not simply the cost of the controllers installed on the perimeter fence, but the cost of providing the power and communications infrastructure to support these controllers around an entire airport perimeter.

These infrastructures and their associated installation costs can often be significantly more than the cost of the intrusion detection system itself.

Of course, if the airport you are securing has a section of radio-transparent fence near an ILS or radar system, then you will need a non-metallic type of sensor on the fence in that area.

On occasion, airports have one or more sides open to the ocean. In these environments, airports would be advised to avoid systems containing copper or steel as they will corrode and have much higher ongoing maintenance requirements.

As airports are typically large, flat, open areas and subject to winds, you will need a technology that can not only compensate for the wind without generating a nuisance alarm but still maintain sensitivity so it can continue to detect intruders.

The newer PIDS technologies employ some fairly advanced signal processing to achieve this, whereas the older technologies struggle to cope.

The next layer will involve the detection and tracking of an intruder once they have penetrated the perimeter. This can be done using a variety of technologies, but commonly comes down to CCTV, microwave, ground based radar systems or similar open area technologies.

CCTV with video analytics uses computers to automatically identify, track, and record intruders as they move away from the fence breach to other areas within the airport, without the operator having to constantly monitor the video.

Linked to a digital video recorder (DVR), CCTV systems also provide forensic video documentation of an intrusion event and the intruder.

There have been many advances in video analytics and intelligent video in recent years. Higher quality systems now include an image tracking feature which allows monitoring of a number of separate intruders simultaneously by drawing a different coloured line around each of them and creating a trail line of where they have been.

Determine where and how many cameras you will need, and also the power and communications infrastructure required. Should you have a number of perimeter cameras, or a just few good quality centrally located PTZ cameras? Can you share the power infrastructure with other devices?

Cameras mounted on buildings tend to be easier to install and more stable than cameras set on the perimeter on poles.

Microwave sensors are volumetric motion detection devices that fl ood an area with a high-frequency fi eld. Any movement within this area disturbs this fi eld and sets off an alarm.

Microwave sensors can be used to monitor an open area or along the inside of a perimeter fence line. As with CCTV, determine the area to be covered and where to position the microwave sensors to pick up power and communications.

Like microwaves, ground-based radars continuously scan large open areas, detecting movements within a defi ned perimeter. Rarely used as a stand-alone intrusion detection system, ground-based radar is more often used in conjunction with intelligent tracking cameras, with the radar used as the detection device and the CCTV camera as the verification and tracking device.

Combined ground-based radar/CCTV systems can provide an effective intrusion detection system for large flat open spaces – especially those difficult areas where you don’t want a physical barrier, or cannot install one, such as over water or on a coastline.

These combined systems have a maximum detection range of typically 200 to 1,000 metres.

Next will be the physical security information management system or PSIM. This is where all of the information from the detectors in the field, the CCTV and/or ground based radar is analysed and prioritised to identify situations that need urgent attention.

A good system presents the entire intrusion scenario to the security staff in a simple to understand manner with clear instructions and procedures to handle them.

Lastly, you need to have enough suitably trained and equipped security response staff, as well as a clearly documented response and escalation procedure to handle intrusion events.

This needs to specify what situations can be handled by the security staff on-site, and what situations require the assistance and backup of police.

The aim of a comprehensive package such as this is to provide a warning that someone has breached the airport perimeter, track them as they move around within the grounds, and delay them long enough for the appropriate security response to take place – before the intruder can reach their target.

Asia-Pacific Airports 2010 Issue 1